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Abstract
The "Criticality HazOp" technique, as developed at Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP),
has allowed for efficiencies enabling shortening ofthe time necessary to complete new or revised
criticality safety evaluation reports (CSERs). For example, in the last half of2007 at PFP, CSER
revisions undergoing the "Criticality HazOp" process were completed at a higher rate than
previously achievable. The efficiencies gained through use of the "Criticality HazOp" process
come from the preliminary narrowing of potential scenarios for the Criticality analyst to fully
evaluate in preparation of the new or revised CSER, and from the use of a systematized
"Criticality HazOp" group assessment of the relevant conditions to show which few
parameter/condition/deviation combinations actually require analytical effort. The "Criticality
HazOp" has not only provided efficiencies of time, but has brought to criticality safety
evaluation revisions the benefits of a structured hazard evaluation method and the enhanced
insight that may be gained from direct involvement of a team in the process. In addition,
involved personnel have gained a higher degree of confidence and understanding of the resulting
CSER product.
The "Criticality HazOp" Process
DOE-STD-3007-2007, Guidelines jor preparing Criticality Sajety Evaluations at Department oj
Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities, requires that a disciplined method for identifying credible
upset conditions be used in the development ofCSERs. PFP has been using the HAZOP method
for several years. The "Criticality HazOp" process that has evolved at PFP has increased the
quality of CSER products while shortening the time required for their production. The
"Criticality HazOp" process combines existing criticality analysis guidance with evaluation
techniques adapted from standard Hazard Analysis methodology to streamline and systematize
the creation of new or revised CSER products. The following subsections describe the steps of
the process and the efficiencies and quality improvements gained through their use.
I
--------------_..__.,---
Define Relevant Controlled Parameters
Parameters for CSER analysis and controls normally include the following:
• Mass(M) • Reflection (R)
• Volume (V) • Enrichment (E)
• Interaction (I) • Density (D)
• Geometry (G) • Concentration (C)
• Moderation (Mod) • Poisons (P)
Not all parameters are relevant for every criticality analysis. Some parameters may only be
applicable to types of processes different from the one under consideration (e.g., "Poisons" is
often considered solutions-processing-related and normally would not be considered applicable
to, as an example, a waste container analysis).
The "Criticality HazOp" process begins with an assessment of the particulars of the operation to
be evaluated to determine which parameters are actually relevant to the analysis, and which may
be disregarded. This is normally performed cooperatively by the Criticality and Hazard analysts,
before a "Criticality HazOp" meeting is called. Depending on the nature of the process being
analyzed, the determination may be immediately obvious, or may require some amount of
judgment on the part of the Criticality analyst to decide if a particular parameter may be
disregarded or not.
Determine Potential Relevant Conditions
When the relevant parameters for the CSER have been chosen, a further narrowing of emphasis
is performed when a list of pre-defined relevant conditions taken from ANSVANS 8.1 is
evaluated for each parameter. Not every parameter will be relevant for every condition, and in
evaluating the list of parameters against the list ofrelevant conditions, decisions as to which of
the parameters will be affected can be made and recorded.
A tabular form of the lists of conditions given in ANSVANS 8.1 has been developed at PFP to
aid in this determination, and is shown in Table 1:
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Table 1: E:I;ample ANSIIANS 8.1 Conditions table
Affected Condition RelevantParam~tet QrN/A?
Variations to the enuioment's orimarv control dimension due to:
Fabrication tolerances, including failure to meet specifications in fabrication,
Mechanical disarrangement (eal1houake),
Chemical attack (Corrosion),
Thermal effect (fire),
Effects due to accidental pressurization,
Bulging,
Excesses in the mass or volume in a batch from errors in:
Segreeatine materials of different enrichments,
Procedure (multiple batching Or other operational error),
Analvsis (decimal point errors, in information transmittal, or non-representative samples),
Maintaining uniformity of materials (precipitates, samples from one phase or two-phase system,
etc.).
Improper labeling.
Loss ofcontrol of number or size of containers.
Equipment failure.
Excess of mass in a non-safe geometry vessel resulting from:
Flow through cross connections such as vents, overflows, or chemical addition lines.
Accidental transfers resulting from valve leakage,
Unauthorized piping changes.
Chanf(es in f(eometry resulting from:
Leakage (from corrosion).
Mechanical failure (e. e., bursting of a container or mold breakaee).
Mechanical compacting (accidental crushing of shapes in a hydraulic lift or fire).
Natural phenomena UP to the DSA considered seismic event.
Changes in reflection from:
Flooding
Soaking of inSUlation.
Filling of a iacket space by leakage.
Approach of personnel.
Addition of shielding.
Accidental movement relative to reflectors such as glovebox or hood walls (from dunnage
failure).
Loss of absorber (e.e" bv corrosion of an outer casing of absorber).
Chanl!es in concentration from:
Recycling or refluxing (from chemical makeup errors involving loss of salting strength, or !Tom
flow failure, flooding, or other process failure j.
Precipitation.
Accumulation.
An increase in the density of fissionable material.
Evaporation.
Dilution.
Other process upsets.
(cont.)
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1'aldel:J;xample ANSI/ANS8.! Conditions1'abJe
f\ife<>(ed Condition Relevantl'llramelfr OrNIA?
Increased interaction from:
Collapse of shelving or spacers.
Introduction of reflector (e.g., personnel).
Material in transit.
Excessive additions to an array (including possible multiple batching at the center of the array).
Loss of moderator and absorber between units.
Changes in relative position of units by water flooding and floating of units (with possible
relevant changes in reflection of individual units).
Spacing errors, including improper placing of units.
Chan!!es In moderation from:
In-leakage.
Inaccuracies in instruments or chemical analyses.
Absorption by hygroscopic material.
Flooding, spraying, or otherwise supplying units or groups of units with water, oil, snow (i.e.,
low-density water), cardboard, wood, or other moderating material.
Condensation.
Inadequate drying (as by loss of temperature control from instrument malfunction).
Introducing air bubbles between rows of fuel assemblies in a storage basin.
Firefighting activity.
Evaporation or displacement of moderator.
Precipitation.
Dilution.
Deliquescence.
No drains to prevent excessive solution height.
Accidental use of moderating liquid in place of non-moderating liquid (as water vs. carbon
tetrachloride)
Chan!!es in absorbers from:
Loss of solid absorber bv corrosion or bv leaching.
Redistribution of absorber and fissionable material by precipitation of one but not the other
from a solution.
Redistribution of solid absorber within a matrix of moderator or solution bv clumping.
Failure to add the intended amount of absorber to a solution Or failure to add it with the
intended distribution.
Failure of analytical techniques to yield correct amounts of concentrations.
Naturall'henomena and Other
Fire Fighting.
Flooding.
Earthquake.
IrOthers as needed]
For each condition relevant to the analysis at hand, the parameters which may affect or be
affected by that condition are noted on the table. This provides the base set of items to be
evaluated in the "Criticality HazOp" meeting. It is not necessary to carry the whole table into the
"Criticality HazOp" meeting - for clarity and efficiency, only those sections of the table showing
evaluated, relevant conditions are included for use. Table 2 gives an example of a table
completed to this point, taken from a CSER evaluating storage of nuclear material containers:
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TableZ:Examnle;l'a.ttilll ANSJlANS 8,1 HlIZards Assessllie;ntParameter{.ist
Affected Condition Relevant
Parameter QrN/A?
~uf,;inentdimensional variation due to:
V 1Fabrication tolerances, including failure to meet soecifications in fabrication,
I1G Mechanical disarranQement (earthauake). I
Excesses in the mass or volume from errors in:
M SeQreQatinQ materials af different emichments
M/V Overbatching
M/V IIIG Loss of control of number or size of containers
M MaintaininQ unifarmitv af materials
Excess of mass in a non-safe-geometrv vessel resulting from:
G Cross connections
G Unauthorized piping changes
G Accidental transfers resulting from valve leakage
Chan';es in-;;eome~resultinp from
G Soilling or leakage
I1G Mechanical comoactinQ
G Natural nhenomena
Chan"es in reflection from
M FloodiflQ I
I Addition of shielding(dose'reduction campai,,;;)
Chanpes in concentration from
M/V II Precipitation
M/V II Accumulation
M/V II Evanoration
Increased interaction from
G Collanse of shelvinQ or snacers
1 Material in transit
IIG SnacinQ errar
,<;hanges in!!,~deration from
-- Condensation
-- Ev'maratian
-- Draining
Natural Phenomena and Other
M/V/l/G Fire fi;htinQ
M/V IIIG FloodinQ
M/V IIIG Earthauake
Convene "Criticality HazOp" Meeting
A "Criticality HazOp" meeting should include personnel from an array of disciplines: the
Criticality and Hazard analysts; potentially other criticality engineers; operations; safeguards;
and other affected groups at the facility.
The meeting proceeds much like a normal hazards evaluation meeting, with an initial briefing
from the Criticality analyst on the operation to be evaluated, and the equipment and locations
that the hazard evaluation team must be concerned with. This allows everyone to begin on the
same footing. A list of assumptions may be generated from discussion during this portion of the
meeting.
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The prepared ANSI!ANS 8.1 list is distributed, and each item is discussed by the team. Each
affected parameter is considered: first, the team determines if the given parameter for a
particular condition is actually affected and belongs on the list; second, the team discusses each
parameter in light of the particular situation (i.e., equipment, process, location, etc.) related to the
operation to be evaluated to determine if that particular parameter is actually relevant in the
current case. Those parameters judged to be relevant are the ones which will be evaluated in the
hazard evaluation portion of the meeting. Table 3 gives an example (from the same "Criticality
HazOp" session as above) of a completed table, indicating which parameters for a particular
condition are judged relevant ("X"), and which are not (N/A).
Table3: Example CoitlriletedANstlANs8.1flilzards AssessmentParameier tist
Affeeted Condition RelevantParllll1.eter OrN/A?
Eauioment dimensional variation due to:
V Fabrication tolerances, including failure to meet specifications in fabricatiolL I N/A
I1G Mechanical disarrangement (earthquake). I N/A
Excesses in the mass or volume from errors in:
M Segregating materials of different enrichments N/A
M/V Overbatching N/A
M/VIIIG Loss of control of number or size of containers N/A
M Maintaining uniforntitv of materials N/A
(cont.)
Excess of mass in a non-safe-2eometrv vessel resullin" from:
G Cross connections N/A
G Unauthorized piping changes N/A
G Accidental transfers resulting from valve leakage N/A
Chanees in eeometrv resultine from
G Spilling or leakage N/A
I1G Mechanical compacting N/A
G Natural phenomena X
Chanees in renection from
M Flooding I X
I Addition of shielding (dose reduction campaign) I X
Chanees in concentration from
M/V II Precipitation N/A
M/V II Accumulation N/A
M/V II Evaporation N/A
Increased interaction from
G Collapse of shelvin" or spacers N/A
I Material in transit X
I1G Spacing errOr X
Chanees in moderation from
--
Condensation N/A
--
Evaporation N/A
--
Draining N/A
Natural Phenomena and Other
M/V/IIG Fire Fighting X
M/V/IIG Flooding X
M/V/I1G Earthquake X
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When the relevant parameters have been selected and agreed upon, each is assessed for their
potential criticality hazard using a modified "HazOp" technique. Each relevant parameter is
brought up and has a "deviation" applied to it. The resulting conditions are discussed and
assessed to determine the affect that the deviation may have on the parameter, and whether that
parameter deviation may pose any new or changed criticality hazards. Similar to a normal
"HazOp," a deviation guide (see Table 4) is normally used to systematize the assessment, and to
spark discussions and new ideas among the participants. Frequency rankings are assigned using
standardized ranges.
Results are recorded in a table (see Table 5), which will serve as the end product of the
"Criticality HazOp," and is the process's input to the Criticality analyst. It should be noted that
the "Notes" column, which records discussions and facts brought up during the "Criticality
HazOp" meeting, can prove extremely important as a source of captured information and
assumptions to be used in the analyst's work.
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Table 4: Hazards and 0
Reverse
Backflow
Other Than,
Where Else
Wrong material
Tube rupture
As Wen As, AlsoPart Of
Tube leak
More,
High,
Lon
Too fast
Too long,
too much
External rupture
More ingredient!
hicll concentration
Less,
Low,
Short
Low level
Low pH
Low rate,
low total
Too short,
too little
Too slow
Voltage low
Degraded
confinement
External leak
Low pressure
Low vlscosit
Low temnerature
Less ingredient!
Low concentration
No,
Not,
None
Stopped
No flow
Utility failure
No confinement
Missing ingredient
Skipped or missing
stc·
o
Static
Level
Current
Special
pH
Voltage
Sneed
Flow
Pressure
Viscosi"
Agitation
Process
Parameter
Confinement
Temnerature
Composition!
Concentration
Time procedure
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< TableS: Example CSER 1I~.rd$A~¢SSme'dTable
Item Parameter Deviation Causes Cons~q ..ences, ", Freq.No.
".
Rearrangement of close-packed
I Geometry Less favorable Seismic event N/A -- V
array reduces interaction and
actually gives a more favorable
geometry.
Increased reactivity of This is an expected upset, and the2 Reflection Increased Flooding Array None A case of a fully-flooded Array willArray be analyzed in this CSER.
If the loaded container is flooded
external to the secondary
3 Reflection Decreased Flooded individual NlA VorEU containment vessel, it serves to
container
--
further isolate the contained
material from the rest of the
Array.
Shielding bounded by full
flooding. Pb reflects fast
4 Reflection Increased Addition ofPb Possible increase in None A neutrons, but very few neutronS
shielding reactivity leaving the containers are
anything other than thennal in
energy leveL
5 Reflection Decreased Addition of borated Decrease in reactivity None Apolyethylene shielding --
Administrative
movement controls
Material in transit (in Increased reactivity of6 Interaction Increased wagons, hand-carried, Implemented physical A --
etc.) approaches Array system controls
Procedures & Training
Administrative Containers on wheeled dollies
movement controls
may interact with wagons.
7 Interaction Increased Spacing errors Increased reactivity of Implemented physical A
system
controls Items to cover for spacing caninclude containers, wagons,
Procedures & Training 200-g waste drwns, SWBs, etc.
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Table 5: Example CSER Hazards Assessment TableIt£J Pa.....neter I I)eviatlon I Causes I (i:o\1$~qilen¢es I Barri~rsNo.
Fire~fighting action Increased reactivity of8 I Geometry I Less favorable I rearranges containers I None
in array system
9 I Reflection I Increased Fire-fighting flooding Increased reactivity of I NoneModeration system
10 I Reflection I Increased Flooding from natural Increased reactivity of I NoneModeration causes system
11 I Geometry Less favorable Seismic event N/A
12 I Interaction Increased Seismic event Increased reactivity of Implemented physical
system controls
Freq.
A
A
A
U
A
Notes
Rearrangement of close-packed
array reduces interaction and
actually gives a more favorable
geometry.
13 Interaction Increased
Non-compliant
container (Le.,
incorrectly assembled
with internal Structures
missing)
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N/A Procedures & Training
Single:
A
Array:
EU
The "heat shields" that fit in the
top of the container have been
left off before, briefly, before
drum lids were sealed. If one is
left off, it creates a slightly-less
shielded pathway through the top
of the container for interaction.
While it is just possible that this
might happen with a single
container, it is very unlikely to
occur in an entire Array worth of
containers.
Apply "Criticality HazOp" Results to Analysis
In reviewing the "Criticality HazOp" results, the analyst will nonnally concentrate on analyzing
those conditions which were judged during the meeting to have a frequency of "Anticipated".
These conditions will nonnally prove to be bounding for the other conditions assessed in the
table. Conditions with assigned frequencies of "Unlikely" or "Extremely Unlikely" may be used
for contingency/upset analyses. The CSER analyses are then perfonned using nonnal, approved
methods.
Publish "Criticality HazOp" Results
The report for the "Criticality HazOp" is nonnally presented as an Appendix to the CSER. This
report is structured as a condensed Hazard Evaluation document, and nonnally contains the
following sections:
• Introduction - Provides the basic infonnation regarding the CSER being revised, and
the scope of the "Criticality HazOp."
• Hazard Assessment and Scope - Provides the list of relevant parameters (and perhaps a
rationale for including or excluding certain parameters), and the completed ANSVANS
8.1 table as shown in Table 3 above.
• Hazards Assessment - Provides the attendance list for the "Criticality HazOp" meeting,
an explanation of the rationale for and specifics of the hazard evaluation, and the results
of the hazards evaluation, including whether any new or increased hazards were
uncovered as a result of the "Criticality HazOp."
• Raw Hazards Assessment Table - The completed table generated in the "Criticality
HazOp" meeting, as shown in Table 5 above.
Conclusion
The "Criticality HazOp" technique, as it has evolved at PFP, has proven to be an efficient tool
for quickly focusing analytical efforts in the creation or revision ofCSERs. Through pre-
assessing relevant parameters and conditions, and using the group-based, systematic evaluation
techniques of a HazOp-type meeting, the specific analyses required to be undertaken for the
particular CSER can be quickly narrowed down. This allows the Criticality Analyst to more
effectively direct analytical time and expedite the completion of the CSER.
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